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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Unavoidable Accident Instruction. Cooper v. Pay-N-Save Drugs,
Inc.,' and Schultz v. Cheney School Dist.2 concerned the use of the un-
avoidable accident instruction' by trial courts. The court held that the
giving of the instruction was error in the Cooper case but not error in
the Schultz case.
In the Cooper case a customer in the defendant's store went to a
shelf to select merchandise. At the base of the shelf she observed a
portable barbecue set. In turning to leave she caught her foot on the
barbecue and fell to the floor.
In the Schultz case a bus driver for the defendant school district
received a bee sting which diverted his attention and, while he tried
to remove the bee from the inside of his shirt, the bus went into the
ditch. The plaintiff fell from her seat in the bus and was injured.
The court in the Cooper case reviewed its prior decisions on the
unavoidable accident instruction and derived the following rule:
[S]tated affirmatively ... it is proper to give the instruction if there
is affirmative evidence that an unavoidable accident4] occurred ; stated
negatively, it is error to give the instruction if there is no evidence of
an unavoidable accident or if the only issue possible under the facts is
that of negligence and contributory negligence.'
When a review of the record disclosed no issues except negligence and
contributory negligence, the court decided that the unavoidable acci-
dent instruction should not have been given. Applying the same rule
159 Wn.2d 829, 371 P.2d 43 (1962).
2 59 Wn.2d 845, 371 P.2d 59 (1962). Both the Cooper case and the Schultz case
were departmental decisions; they came from different departments.
3 A typical unavoidable accident instruction is found in the Uniform Jury Instruc-
tions for King County, Washington No. 44 (1955): "In law we recognize what is
termed an unavoidable or inevitable accident. These terms do not mean literally that
it was not possible for such an accident to be avoided. They simply denote an accident
that occurred without having been proximately caused by negligence. Even if such an
accident could have been avoided by the exercise of exceptional forsight, skill or
caution, no one may be held liable for injuries resulting from it."
4 In Jackson v. City of Seattle, 15 Wn.2d 505, 513, 131 P.2d 172, 176 (1942), the
court defined unavoidable accident: "An accident may be inevitable in that it resulted
without human agency and by so-called 'act of God.' But the term 'unavoidable
accident,' in a more restricted sense, means an accident that could not have been
prevented by the exercise of due care on the part of human actors involved. This
court approved the giving of an instruction employing the term in this narrow sense
in Hayes v. Staples, 129 Wash. 436, 225 Pac. 417 . . . .So employed, 'unavoidable
accident' has been defined as meaning an accident which cannot be avoided by that
degree of prudence, foresight, care, and caution which the law requires of everyone
under the circumstances of the particular case, which is not occasioned in any degree,
either remotely or directly, by the want of such care and skill as the law holds every
man bound to exercise, or which occurs without fault attributable to anyone. And, in
this sense, it has been held to be equivalent to, or synonymous with, 'mere accident' or
'pure accident.' 1 C.J.S., 443, 444."
5 59 Wn.2d 829, 835-836, 371 P.2d 43, 47 (1962).
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in the Schultz case the court reached an opposite result upon con-
cluding that there was evidence of an unavoidable accident.
Unavoidable accident cases usually turn on the propriety of giving
the instruction and not on its form or content.' Arguments against
giving the instruction are: (1) The burden of proving the defendant's
negligence is already placed upon the plaintiff by instructions on
negligence, proximate cause and burden of proof. The defendant
receives adequate protection from those instructions and from the
customary instruction that "a party is not entitled to recover solely
because there has been an accident." The instructions on negligence
and unavoidable accident differ only in their approach to the same
question: Was the defendant negligent?' (2) The unavoidable acci-
dent instruction over-emphasizes the defendant's case since the same
point covered in the unavoidable accident instruction is also covered
in other instructions.' (3) The instruction actually confuses and
misleads the jury.' If the jury are confused on issues of negligence,
contributory negligence or proximate cause, they may be prone to
give the easy answer of unavoidable accident.
Arguments in favor of giving the instruction are: (1) The jury
may lose sight of the fact that there are injuries for which no one is
at fault. Especially in cases involving issues both of negligence and
contributory negligence, the jury are likely to think that the injury
would not have happened unless one or the other or both of the
parties were at fault. The unavoidable accident instruction should
be given so that proper weight will be attributed to the possibility that
8 Annot, 65 A.L.R2d 12, 119 (1959).
7 Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co., 49 Cal. App. 2d 652, 320 P2d 500 (1958) ; Comment,
The Unavoidable Accident Instruction, 33 So. CAL. L. REv. 72 (1959).
Concerning the burden of proof on the unavoidable accident question, the burden
remains on the plaintiff since this is still the question of negligence, but phrased differ-
ently. See Hardman v. Younkers, 15 Wn2d 483, 492, 131 P.2d 177, 181 (1942).
Compare Taylor v. Lubetich, 2 Wn.2d 6, 97 P.2d 141 (1939), and Lauber v. Lyon,
188 Wash. 644, 63 P.2d 389 (1936).
In general, the Washington court does not treat the question of unavoidable acci-
dent as a separate issue, see note 30 infra, with the result that the question can be
raised by the defendant by his denial of negligence and without affirmative defense.
See Hardman v. Younkers, supra at 492, 131 P2d at 181; and note 30 infra.8 Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co., 49 Cal. App. 2d 652, 659, 320 P.2d 500, 505 (1958).
The court in the Butigan case criticizes the instruction on unavoidable accident: "In
reality the so called defense of unavoidable accident has no legitimate place in our
pleading." Id. at 658, 320 P.2d at 504. The split court (four-to-three) said it did not
approve of the outmoded doctrine, except in special circumstances. The question in
California is now: What are those special circumstances?
9 This reason is given by the court in Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co., 49 Cal. App. 2d
652, 320 P2d 500 (1958). The court suggests that the jury is prone to treat the un-
avoidable accident question as an issue distinct from negligence. For a criticism of
the Butigan decision, see Palmer, The Avoidable Decision, 33 Los ANGELEs BAn
BULL. 299 (1958).
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neither party was negligent." (2) The instruction may clarify the
other instructions which were perhaps more confusing." If the un-
avoidable accident instruction merely repeats what has already been
said, then duplication should aid the jury, rather than hinder or con-
fuse them. (3) At the trial, the term "unavoidable accident" has
been used by counsel in front of the jury, and, to prevent confusion,
the court should explain the term."
No Washington case states reasons for giving or not giving the
instruction. Generally the Washington court bases its decisions on
conclusionary statements to the effect that before the instruction is
to be given there must be something more in issue than negligence and
contributory negligence. Then the court has concluded that there was
or was not evidence of an unavoidable accident.'
The Cooper rule may change the use of the instruction by imposing
a prerequisite for the giving of the instruction, viz., that there be
actual evidence of an unavoidable accident. This apparently means
that there must be at issue the question whether anyone was negli-
gent. It is not enough that there be dispute over whether the defendant
was negligent or the plaintiff contributorily negligent. 4
1 0 In Wheeler v. Glazer 137 Tex. 341, 153 S.W.2d 449, 452 (1941), the court
said: "The only legitimate purpose to be served in submitting unavoidable accident
is . . . so that the jury will understand that they do not necessarily have to find that
one or the other parties to the suit was to blame ... "
11 See Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co., 49 Cal. App. 2d 652, 320 P.2d 500, 506 (1958)
(dissenting opinion).
12 See Palmer, The Avoidable Decision, 33 Los ANGELES BAR BULL. 299 (1958).
13 In Lindsey v. Elkins, 154 Wash. 588, 283 Pac. 447 (1929), the defendant testified
that his car was moving when the plaintiff's car struck the defandant from the rear.
The plaintiff's claim was that the defendant had parked the car on the highway on
a dark and rainy night. If the defendant had not been stopped at the time of the
collision the accident might have been unavoidable, justifying the instruction. How-
ever, the court stated that there were no facts from which the jury could find that
the accident was unavoidable. See Barnes v. Labor Hall Ass'n, 51 Wn.2d 421, 319
P.2d 554 (1957), where the court said the only issues involved were of negligence.
Plaintiff fell on defendant's stairway, and there was some evidence from which the
jury might have inferred that a clamp on a hand rail crystalized and broke through
no negligence of the defendant. In spite of this, the court refused to say that there
was any evidence of an unavoidable accident.
Compare Jackson v. City of Seattle, 15 Wn.2d 505, 131 P.2d 172 (1942), where
the question of unavoidable accident dependent upon the place at which the defendant's
bus driver stopped the bus. The bus driver testified he stopped east of the pole, so
the plaintiff could not have stepped in the holes which were west of the pole. The
court approved of the giving of the unavoidable accident instruction in this case.
In each of these three cases the supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision
with respect to the giving or refusal of the unavoidable accident instruction. In each
case the evidence was from the testimony of the defendant or his agent.
This apparent inconsistency can be explained by reluctance to reverse the trial
court's or jury's findings. See text accompanying notes 35-36 infra.
14Brewer v. Berner, 15 Wn.2d 644, 650, 131 P.2d 940, 943 (1942), implies this
interpretation when the court says: "There was no evidence that the collision between
the two cars was the result of an unavoidable accident. On the contrary, the evidence
[VOL. 38
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Accordingly, it is clearly error to give the instruction when either
party is negligent as a matter of law. In that situation there has been
no unavoidable accident," since the injury could have been prevented
by the exercise of due care.
As a corollary, if the accident could not have happened unless either
one or both of the parties were negligent, the instruction should not
be given, since the accident then too was avoidable. 6 The instruction
may seem proper, since the accident might have been unavoidable by
the defendant and the instruction would not prejudice a contributorily
negligent plaintiff. This was the California position before 1958, the
result of which was to find the instruction proper in any case where
the defendant was not negligent as a matter of law."
Washington nearly reached the same conclusion in Pement v. F. W.
Woolworth Co.'8 Relying on a leading California case, Parker v. Wo-
mack," the Washington court said: "[I] f there was no claim that the
defendant was negligent as a matter of law-that is to say, if the issue
of negligence was one of fact for the jury's determination, there was
no error in instructing upon unavoidable accident."2  (Emphasis
added.)
The Pement case suggests that the instruction is proper whenever
negligence is in issue and the defendant is not negligent as a matter of
presented but two questions for the jury to decide, and those questions were negligence
on the part of the respondent and contributory negligence on the part of the appellant."25 In Gaylord v. Schwartz, 46 Wn2d 315, 281 P.2d 247 (1955) (dictum), the
court stated that where the plaintiff is contributorily negligent as a matter of law,
the giving of an unavoidable accident instruction is improper but not prejudicial, and
therefore not reversible error. The plaintiff would have lost the case anyway. See
Oatman v. Frey 108 Ohio App. 72, 160 N.E.2d 664 (1958) (by implication).
16See Rettig v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 22 Wn.2d 572, 156 P.2d 914 (1945). Cf.,
Brewer v. Berner 15 Wn.2d 644, 131 P2d 940 (1942). But see Webb v. City of
Seattle, 22 Wn.2d 596, 157 P.2d 312 (1945), where a fourteen year-old child ran into
the street with his classmates, chasing a bus, when he fell or was pushed under one
of the wheels. The court indicated that the unavoidable accident instruction was
proper in this case since the boy may have been pushed. Quaere: Even if the boy
were pushed was he not contributorily negligent in subjecting himself to the chance
of being pushed when chasing a bus with a crowd of children? See McClarren v.
Buck, 340 Mich. 300, 72 N.W.2d 31 (1955).
'7 Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 12, 21 (1959).
18 53 Wn2d 768, 337 P.2d 30 (1959). The plaintiff sustained a fall allegedly be-
cause of the defendant's misapplication of "Myco-Sheen;' a floor preparation. The
trial court instructed the jury with reference to unavoidable accident. The verdict
for the defendant was affirmed.
19 37 Cal. App. 2d 116, 230 P2d 823 (1951). The Parker case was a leading case
for the lenient use of the unavoidable accident instruction in California and one which
Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co., 49 Cal. App. 2d 652, 320 P2d 500 (1958), specifically
overruled in 1958. The court in the Butigan case said that the instruction was out-
moded and should not be given. For an account of the development of the unavoidable
accident instruction in California, see Comment, The Unavoidable Accident Instruc-
tion, 33 So. CaL.. L. REv. 72 (1959).20 Pement v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 53 Wn2d 768, 772, 337 P.2d 30, 32 (1959).
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law 1 (in contrast to the usual Washington statement requiring evi-
dence that neither party is negligent). The rule stated in Pement no
longer has vitality, since in Cooper the court recognized that it con-
flicts with earlier cases. But the facts of the Pement case did include
evidence of unavoidable accident. Therefore that case can be factually
reconciled with other Washington cases, including Cooper, even though
it sanctioned a broader rule of law than the holding of the Cooper
case would allow.
Application of the Cooper rule raises the troublesome question
whether the instruction is proper when the jury may find both parties
free from fault. The majority view permits the instruction in this
situation.
But what does the court mean in the Cooper case by saying there
must be affirmative evidence of an unavoidable accident? Does it
mean that in addition to evidence tending to show that neither party
was at fault, there must also be evidence of the real cause of the
accident? 2  If the instruction were given, the jury might think it
necessary to find someone negligent, unless they could ascertain the
true cause. On this view the court should have concluded in Jackson
v. City of Seattle2 ' Gaylord v. Schwartz26 and Pement v. F. W. Wool-
worth Co., 7 that the unavoidable accident instruction was improper.
Yet in each case the court upheld the trial court which had given the
instruction.
In speaking of affirmative evidence of an unavoidable accident the
21 In support of this statement and as an indication that the Washington Supreme
Court intended what it said, it also cited Hughes v. MacDonald, 133 Cal. App. 2d 74,
283 P.2d 360 (1955), and Shouten v. Crawford, 118 Cal. App. 2d 59, 257 P.2d 88
(1953), in which cases the California court stated that where proximate cause or
negligence is a question for the jury, it is not error to instruct on unavoidable
accident. This meant the instruction was proper in practically every negligence case.
22 In Washington, the cases of Gaylord v. Schwartz, 46 Wn.2d 315, 281 P.2d 247
(1955), and Jackson v. City of Seattle, 15 Wn.2d 505, 131 P.2d 172 (1942), indicate the
answer should be yes. For an opposite conclusion, however, see Barnes v. Labor Hall
Ass'n, 51 Wn.2d 421, 319 P.2d 554 (1957), and Lindsey v. Elkins, 154 Wash. 588, 283
Pac. 447 (1929). For a possible explanation of the apparent inconsistency see note 13
supra and text accompanying notes 35-37 infra.
23 Cantrill v. American Mail Line, 42 Wn.2d 590, 257 P.2d 179 (1953) ; Brewer v.
Berner, 15 Wn.2d 644, 131 P.2d 940 (1942). This seems to be the majority view
concerning the propriety of giving the instruction. See Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 12, 36-37
(1959) and cases cited. The annotation indicates there is a lack of uniformity as to
the circumstances in which the instruction may be given. The variety of circum-
stances is well illustrated there.
24One could interpret Hicks v. Brown, 136 Tex. 399, 151 S.W.2d 790 (1941), as
having taken this view. However, in Wichita Transit Co. v. Sanders, 214 S.W.2d
810 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948), there is some confusion on this point.
25 15 Wn.2d 505, 131 P.2d 172 (1942).
26 46 Wn.2d 315, 281 P.2d 247 (1955).
27 53 Wn.2d 768, 337 P.2d 30 (1959).
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court probably means that anything which disproves either negli-
gence or unavoidable accident must affirmatively prove the other.
Evidence tending to show lack of negligence is, then, affirmative evi-
dence of unavoidable accident."
It is not enough that each party tries to absolve himself of fault
solely by evidence of the other's negligence, since these efforts would
not satisfy the requirements that there be evidence of non-negligence,"
and the unavoidable accident instruction could not properly be given. 0
The crux of the dispute, therefore, is whether anyone did in fact
introduce evidence showing an absence of negligence. Two prominent
features of unavoidable accident cases furnish a partial guide to
answering this question under the facts of a'particular case: The
court is likely to find the evidentiary test satisfied so long as the case
involves: (1) a surprising event or act combined with (2) circum-
stances making a fair issue of whether failure of the defendant to
anticipate and guard against the danger is consistent with the conclu-
sion that he exercised due care.2 '
In the Cooper decision, the court had before it cases ranging from
the most lenient to the most strict in the application of rules regarding
the unavoidable accident instruction. It decided (without telling us
why) to adopt neither extreme, but to refortify its previous position as
stated in 1942 in Brewer v. Berner.2
At the present time, a Washington defendant who obtains a favorable
verdict and the unavoidable accident instruction faces little chance of
reversal on appeal, so long as he has introduced evidence from which
2 8 1n Gaylord v. Schwartz, 46 Wn2d 315, 317, 281 P.2d 247, 248 (1955), the court
said: "Since there was evidence to support a finding that neither . . . was negligent,
it follows that it was proper for the court to give the instruction on unavoidable acci-
dent." See also O'Connell v. Home Oil Co., 180 Wash. 461, 467, 40 P.2d 991, 994
(1935), where the court said: "It is true that the answer did not raise that par-
ticular issue [unavoidable accident] by way of affirmative defense. It is also true
that each party insisted throughout the trial that the other was negligent. But it is
likewise true that each of the parties asserted and emphasized his or their own freedom
from negligence. The evidence, when sifted by the jury according to its view of the
credibility, was reasonably subject to the inference that the accident was an unavoidable
one....'
20 Brewer v. Berner, 15 Wn2d 644, 131 P2d 940 (1942).
30 Hodgson v. Pohl, 9 N.J. 488, 89 A.2d 24 (1952) ; Mittelstadt v. Hartford Acci-
dent & Indemnity Co., 2 Wis. 2d 78, 85 N.W.2d 793 (1957). However, in Gaylord v.
Schwartz, 46 Wn.2d 315, 281 P2d 247 (1955), the court stated that there was not
necessarily proof of negligence on the part of the bicycle rider, plaintiff's ward, from
the mere fact he fell into the path of a truck. Using that statement as its premise
the court concluded: "Since there was no evidence to support a finding that neither
... was negligent, it follows that it was proper for the court to give the instruction
on unavoidable accident." Id. at 317, 281 P.2d at 248.
31 Annot., 65 A.L.R2d 12, 23 (1959). See Cordell v. Scott, 111 N.W.2d 594(S.D. 1961).
2 15 Wn.2d 644, 131 P2d 940 (1942).
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the innocence of both parties may be inferred.3 The trial judge, for
fear of being reversed, may be reluctant to instruct on unavoidable
accident. To this date, Washington, with the majority of states," has
not held it reversible error for the trial court to refuse to give the
instruction. 5 The reason generally given is that the instructions on
negligence, proximate cause, and burden of proof adequately protect
the defendant. 6
L. WILLim HOUGER
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
Part Time Farming-Partial Unemployment. "We... hold that
a person is not automatically ineligible for unemployment com-
pensation simply because he engages in some remunerative activity
of a personal or self-directed nature. Respondent... was unemployed
within the meaning of RCW 50.04.310."'
In these words the Washington Supreme Court permitted the recov-
ery of unemployment compensation, under our statute, by a claimant
who, though temporarily unemployed, assisted in the operation of his
dairy farm.
This decision marks two important developments in the construction
of RCW Title 50, which contains the Washington Unemployment
Compensation statute. It represents the first attempt by the court to
define "self-employed," which the statute omits to define, and, perhaps
more importantly, it rests on a basis of reason and reflection, rather
than on a dogmatic adherence to precedents from other jurisdictions.
Both seem to carry importance for the future.
Mr. Bartel, the claimant, was customarily employed in various types
of work for other employers in his locale. In addition, he and his wife
and nineteen-year-old son opearted a small dairy farm, from which
33 In Van Ry. v. Montgomery, 58 Wn.2d 46, 47, 360 P.2d 573, 574 (1961), the
court said: "In determining whether the court properly submitted to the jury the
question of whether the accident was unavoidable, the evidence must be viewed in
the light most favorable to the defendants." See Tomblinson v. Wise, 163 Wash. 341,
300 Pac. 1056 (1931).
34 See Annot. 65 A.L.R.2d 12, 136 (1959).
35 Cooper v. Pay-N-Save Drug Co., 59 Wn.2d 829, 835, 371 P.2d 43, 47 (1962).
3 6 Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (1961). Contra, Haynes v.
Martinez, 260 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
I Bartel v. Employment Security Department, 160 Wash. Dec. 710, 720, 375 P.2d
154, 161 (1962).
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